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Abstract: 
Conflict, convergence, cooperation, competition and other interactions among governance actors 
and institutions have long fascinated scholars of transnational law, yet transnational legal 
theorists’ accounts of such interactions are for the most part tentative, incomplete and 
unsystematic. Having elsewhere proposed an overarching conceptual framework for the study of 
transnational business governance interactions (TBGI), in this article we propose criteria for 
middle-range theory-building. We argue that a portfolio of theoretical perspectives on 
transnational governance interactions should account for the multiplicity of interacting entities 
and scales of interaction; the co-evolution of social agency and structure; the multiple 
components of regulatory governance; the role of interactions as both influence and outcome; the 
diverse modes of interaction; the mechanisms and pathways of interaction; and the spatio-
temporal dynamics of interaction. To suggest the value of these criteria, we apply them in a 
preliminary way to selected transnational legal scholarship and to the other articles in this special 
issue of Transational Legal Theory. 
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1. THEORIZING INTERACTIVE DYNAMICS: AN INTRODUCTION 
Conflict, convergence, cooperation and competition among legal systems, institutions, actors and 
rules have long fascinated scholars of transnational law. Indeed, understanding the dispersion of rule-
making authority and managing the resulting overlaps and interactions are central problems of 
transnational law.1 These problems have increased as transnational rule systems have proliferated and 
international law has fragmented. In this article we focus on an important subset of the phenomenon: 
interactions among actors and institutions engaged in the transnational governance of business conduct, or 
‘transnational business governance interactions’ (TBGI). We propose criteria for theorizing these 
interactive dynamics and assess the articles in this special issue and other relevant transnational legal 
literature against them.  
Scholars of transnational law frequently recognize the importance of governance interactions and 
address them from diverse perspectives. Yet with notable exceptions, their accounts are tentative, 
incomplete and unsystematic. Philip Jessup’s 1956 Storrs Lectures are illustrative. They show that 
interaction among legal orders has been a preoccupation of transnational law since its beginnings.2 Jessup 
was concerned with the dispersion of ‘authority to make the rules men live by’, the transnational 
proliferation of law-making institutions and the interplay among rule systems.3 He saw the core problem 
for transnational law as determining which actors have effective authority to deal with which 
transnational situations and which rules prevail in cases of conflict. Jessup thus focused on rule conflict, 
primarily in the context of adjudication; his primary prescription was to authorize adjudicators ‘to choose 
from all of these bodies of law the rule considered to be most in conformity with reason and justice for 
the solution of any particular controversy’.4  
Yet Jessup painted an incomplete picture. First, conflict is only one mode of interaction. Even 
within conflict of laws, cooperation abounds, through treaties, model laws, supranational legislation and 
mutual adjustment of national laws.5 Second, adjudication is only one component of regulatory 
governance; interaction also occurs at other stages. Most importantly, Jessup was frustratingly vague 
about the dynamics of interaction among normative orders. And although he recognized that non-state 
actors and institutions may promulgate legal rules, he barely explored their interactions with other legal 
orders.6 
We argue for a more systematic, comprehensive analysis of the interactive dimension of 
transnational law. Our first step in this direction was to articulate a general analytical framework,7 
summarized at the start of Part 3. Grounded in a regulatory governance perspective, the TBGI framework 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1 Eg Philip Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956) 4–8. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Jessup (n1) 8. 
4 Jessup (n1) 106. 
5 Eg Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (Edward Elgar, 2nd edn 2010). 
6 The exception is a brief mention of maritime law as a mix of national laws, treaties and non-state rules. Jessup (n 
1) 109–110. 
7 Burkard Eberlein and others, ‘Transnational Business Governance Interactions: Conceptualization and Framework 
for Analysis’ (2014) 8 Regulation and Governance 1. 
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enables scholars to explore interactions among transnational, state and interstate rule systems; examine 
the effects of interactions on governance capacity, outputs, outcomes and impacts; and investigate how 
interactions can be steered to foster desired effects. It provides a common frame within which to identify 
knowledge gaps, plan research, compare results and generate descriptive typologies.   
Yet an analytical framework can take us only so far. In the remainder of Part 3, we consider 
theory development. Given the complexity of transnational governance interactions, no single theoretical 
approach can be satisfactory. Thus, we aim to foster theoretical experimentation while encouraging the 
application of perspectives that are well suited to produce valuable insights in this complex field. For that 
purpose, we propose seven broad criteria for theory building: a portfolio or toolkit of theoretical 
perspectives on TBGI should account for the multiplicity of interacting entities and scales of interaction; 
the co-evolution of social agency and structure; the multiple components of regulatory governance; the 
role of interactions as both influence and outcome; the diverse modes of interaction; the mechanisms and 
pathways of interaction; and the spatio-temporal dynamics of interaction. To suggest the value of these 
criteria, we apply them in a preliminary way to the articles in this special issue and other relevant works.8 
2. TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS GOVERNANCE INTERACTIONS 
Efforts to govern transnational activities have long existed in many domains of economic and 
social life, including weights and measures,9 products,10 accounting,11 electricity,12 and religious 
observance.13 With globalization, these efforts have proliferated. Today virtually every issue area, 
industry or profession that transcends national borders is the object of at least one transnational 
governance program. These range from straightforward technical coordination standards to the regulation 
of contentious production and consumption externalities.14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
8 See also Stepan Wood, ‘Transnational Governance Interactions: A Critical Review of the Legal Literature,’ 
Osgoode Hall Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 35/2015, TBGI Project Subseries No. 21, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2644465. We engage with scholarship in international relations, political science and global 
governance in Eberlein, ibid.  
9 Robert Tavernor, Smoot’s Ear: The Measure of Humanity (Yale University Press, 2007). 
10 John Perry, The Story of Standards (Funk & Wagnalls, 1955); Alan O Sykes, Product Standards for 
Internationally Integrated Goods Markets (Brookings Institute, 1995). 
11 Kees Camfferman and Stephen A Zeff, Financial Reporting and Global Capital Markets: A History of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee 1973–2000 (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
12 Tim Büthe, ‘Engineering Uncontestedness? The Origins and Institutional Development of the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)’ (2010) 12(3) Business & Politics Article 4 
<www.bepress.com/bap/vol12/iss3/art4> accessed 12 August 2014. 
13 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamic Texts Society, 3rd edn 2003); Timothy 
D Lytton, Kosher: Private Regulation in the Age of Industrial Food (Harvard, 2013). 
14 Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘International “Standards” and International Governance’ (2001) 8 
Journal of European Public Policy 345; Errol Meidinger, ‘Beyond Westphalia: Competitive Legalization in 
Emerging Transnational Regulatory Systems’ in Christian Brütsch and Dirk Lehmkuhl (eds), Law and Legalization 
in Transnational Relations (Routledge, 2007). 
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With this multiplicity come increasingly complex interactions. In some domains, one governance 
scheme achieves dominance.15 In others, schemes address different issues (eg measuring greenhouse gas 
emissions vs the effectiveness of mitigation projects)16 or regulatory tasks (eg rule-making, enforcement 
and adjudication). In still others, schemes compete for ‘regulatory share’.17 They may compete on certain 
matters (eg rule stringency, transparency or verification) while cooperating or converging on others (eg 
general principles or design features). Competition and cooperation may lead to harmonization18 or to 
forum-shopping and persistent divergence.19 Interactions may foster experimentation, efficiency, 
innovation and learning, or engender duplication, inconsistency, confusion and ennui. In short, such 
interactive dynamics have important but little-understood implications for the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of transnational law and governance. They merit systematic study.  
We begin by clarifying the concept of transnational business governance interactions. In 
transnational governance arrangements, non-state actors exercise significant authority in the performance 
of regulatory roles across national borders.20 Like Gregory Shaffer and others, we focus on the 
transnational character of the actors and institutions that produce and apply law,21 not the activities or 
events that law addresses.22 The boundaries of the ‘transnational’ are necessarily fuzzy, and the literature 
abounds with definitions.23 We emphasize the role of non-state actors and institutions in creating and 
exercising regulatory authority—a role that remains under-studied in comparison to that of state and 
interstate organisations. We accept the continuing importance of state and interstate actors, but focus on 
governance arrangements in which non-state actors play decisive roles, alone or with states or 
international organisations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
15 Büthe (n 12) (electricity); John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University 
Press 2000) Chapter 11 (labour). 
16 Eg Kenneth W Abbott, Jessica F Green and Robert O Keohane, ‘Organizational Ecology and Institutional Change 
in Global Governance’ (2016) International Organization, forthcoming. 
17 Julia Black, ‘Legitimacy and the Competition for Regulatory Share’ (2009) LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Paper 14/2009 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1424654> accessed 12 August 2014. 
18 Eg Christine Overdevest, ‘Comparing Forest Certification Schemes: The Case of Ratcheting Standards in the 
Forest Sector’ (2010) 8 Socio-Economic Review 47; Timothy M Smith and Miriam Fischlein, ‘Rival Private 
Governance Networks: Competing to Define the Rules of Sustainability Performance’ (2010) 20 Global 
Environmental Change 511. 
19 Eg Lars H Gulbrandsen, Transnational Environmental Governance: The Emergence and Effects of the 
Certification of Forests and Fisheries (Edward Elgar, 2010); Luc Fransen, ‘Multi-stakeholder Governance and 
Voluntary Programme Interactions: Legitimation Politics in the Institutional Design of Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ (2012) 10 Socio-Economic Review 163. 
20 Eberlein (n 7). 
21 Gregory Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change,’ in Gregory Shaffer (ed), Transnational Legal 
Ordering and State Change (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 1, 5. 
22 Eg Henry J Steiner and Detlev F Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems (Foundation Press, 1968). 
23 Eg Jessup (n 1); Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process’ (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181; 
Thomas Hale and David Held, ‘Editors’ Introduction: Mapping Changes in Transnational Governance’ in Thomas 
Hale and David Held (eds), Handbook of Transnational Governance: Institutions and Innovations (Polity, 2011) 1; 
Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Legal Pluralism’ (2010) 1(2) Transnational Legal Theory 141. 
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We focus on the governance of business, which generates some of the most important challenges 
to (and developments in) global governance.24 Business includes all trade and commerce, whether 
conducted by private or state actors. Crucially, business is a source, not merely a target, of regulatory 
governance. While targets always ‘co-produce’ regulation as they implement it,25 we focus on 
arrangements in which business (often together with civil society groups and other non-state actors) 
exercises authority to perform regulatory roles, from agenda-setting and norm development to monitoring 
and enforcement. Interactions and the theoretical framework we propose may be equally relevant in 
domains where business is less central, such as terrorism, war, human rights, disease or education, but we 
leave these extensions for further research.  
Within the expansive concept of governance, we focus particularly on the regulatory variety.26 
We understand regulation as:  
the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to identified purposes 
with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes which may involve 
mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification.27  
So conceived, regulatory governance encompasses a wide variety of instruments, control mechanisms and 
actors beyond authoritative legal rules promulgated and enforced by the state.28 It presupposes no 
particular institutional arrangements, organisational forms or techniques. It incorporates not only goal-
driven attempts at ordering, but also their failures and unintended consequences.29 Regulatory governance 
is narrower than social control, as it operates through standards, rules, goals, targets or guidelines.30 While 
it encompasses various gradations of coercion,31 it also includes the exercise of epistemic, persuasive and 
influential authority.32 Such authority is important in transnational governance, where regulators ‘have to 
promote a motivational response from those whose behaviour it is they seek to change, but often without 
the infrastructure of the state to fall back on’.33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
24 Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 3. 
25 Julia Black, ‘Regulatory Conversations’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 163. 
26 Eg Errol Meidinger, ‘Multi-Interest Self-Governance through Global Product Certification Programmes’ in Olaf 
Dilling, Martin Herberg and Gerd Winter (eds), Responsible Business: Self-Governance and Law in Transnational 
Economic Transactions (Hart, 2008) 259; David Levi-Faur, ‘Regulation and Regulatory Governance’ in David Levi-
Faur (ed), Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (Edward Elgar, 2011) 1. 
27 Black, ‘Regulatory Conversations’ (n 25) 170.  
28 Colin Scott, ‘Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State,’ in Jacint Jordana and 
David Levi-Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance 
(Edward Elgar, 2004) 161–66. 
29 Eg Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (Pluto, 1994). 
30 Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein and Robert Baldwin, The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk 
Regulation Regimes (Oxford University Press, 2001) 25. 
31 Eg Michael E Conroy, Branded! How the ‘Certification Revolution’ is Transforming Global Corporations (New 
Society, 2007). 
32 Eg Patrick Glenn, ‘Persuasive Authority’ (1987) 32 McGill Law Journal 261; Mayo Moran, ‘Influential Authority 
and the Estoppel-Like Effect of International Law’ in Hilary Charlesworth and others (eds), The Fluid State: 
International Law and National Legal Systems (Federation Press, 2005) 156. 
33 Julia Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’ 
(2008) 2 Regulation & Governance 137, 138–39. 
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We do not address the jurisprudential question of whether particular forms of normative ordering 
constitute law. Much of the transnational law literature remains preoccupied with this question.34 As 
David Szablowski reminds us, law is a powerful label, reflecting collective aspirations for accountability, 
legitimacy, and right.35 As a result, it is a powerful tool for legitimation and critique, and we are interested 
in how actors deploy the ‘law/not law’ distinction to buttress or contest claims of authority. 
Interactions are mutual actions and responses of individuals, groups, institutions, structures or 
systems. They can be intentional or accidental, symmetrical or asymmetrical. Interactions in transnational 
business governance take many forms (eg competition, cooperation, meta-regulation), exploit different 
causal pathways (eg modeling, reciprocal adjustment, conditional rule referencing), produce different 
patterns (eg regulatory ensembles, orchestrations and ecosystems), and have diverse effects (eg 
strengthening or weakening democratic accountability; norm divergence or convergence; ratcheting up or 
down of standards). Interactions can by analyzed at a micro-level (among individual actors or norms), a 
meso-level (among regulatory schemes or regimes), or a macro-level (among regime complexes or 
populations).  
While some may object that our definition of interaction includes everything (and therefore 
explains nothing), at this early stage in theory development it is important to maintain a broad definition 
so as to facilitate comparison across scales and levels, contexts and theoretical perspectives. Refinement 
of the concept can take place at the stage of operationalization.  
 To be sure, transnational (business) governance interactions are just one dimension of 
transnational law and governance. Our analytical framework and theoretical criteria do not purport to 
encompass transnational law as a whole and are not intended to displace general theories of transnational 
law. Rather, they are intended to extend, complement or challenge existing paradigms by insisting on the 
importance of interactive dynamics and by facilitating systematic theoretical attention to them.  
Finally, although we focus here on criteria for explanatory and predictive theories, our analysis is 
informed by a normative agenda. We wish to understand the conditions under which governance 
interactions can advance democracy, justice, fairness, dignity, prosperity and environmental 
sustainability. We share with Boaventura de Sousa Santos, John Braithwaite, Peter Drahos and others a 
desire to understand and enhance the capacity of structurally disadvantaged interests to participate 
effectively in transnational governance.36 How can governance interactions enhance popular sovereignty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
34 Eg Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational 
Private Law (Hart, 2010); Nicole Roughan, Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory 
(Oxford University Press, 2013).  
35 David Szablowski, Transnational Law and Local Struggles: Mining, Communities and the World Bank (Hart, 
2007), 288; see also Stephen Clarkson and Stepan Wood, A Perilous Imbalance: The Globalization of Canadian 
Law and Governance (UBC Press, 2010) 26–27. 
36 Eg Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Towards a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and Emancipation 
(Butterworths, 2002); Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Cesar A Rodríguez-Garavito (eds), Law and Globalization 
from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 
103. 
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and ratchet up transnational standards in the interests of ordinary people and the planet?37 When can 
interaction be a ‘weapon of the weak’38 that empowers marginalized interests?  
3.  THEORIZING TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS GOVERNANCE INTERACTIONS 
Transnational governance is a dynamic, co-regulatory and co-evolutionary process involving 
state, non-state and hybrid actors and institutions at multiple levels. These actors and institutions have 
varied stakes and competencies, perform varied regulatory functions and interact in diverse ways. Our 
TBGI analytical framework has two axes, one representing dimensions of interaction, the other 
components of regulatory governance.39 The resulting matrix enables researchers to decide which aspects 
of TBGI to analyze for what purposes, while leaving theoretical and methodological choices largely open.  
 The first axis of the framework identifies six features of interaction: the nature of the interacting 
entities; the drivers of interaction; the mechanisms and pathways of interaction; the character of 
interaction; the effects of interaction; and the temporal dynamics of interaction. Each of these features can 
be studied at different points in regulatory governance processes, which the second axis disaggregates 
into six components: problem definition and agenda-setting; norm development; implementation; 
monitoring and information gathering; enforcement; and review and evaluation. Although these 
components sometimes form a policy cycle, all are not always present; they have no necessary sequence; 
and they may or may not include feedback loops. These are empirical questions to be determined for each 
case.  
The two axes produce a six-by-six matrix with 36 possible combinations. No study can be 
expected to address all 36 cells. Most studies will address just one or a few. The matrix prompts 
researchers to reflect consciously on which components and dimensions are relevant and facilitates 
comparison of results and identification of knowledge gaps. 
The development and application of this framework provide important guidance as we move to 
theory building on TBGI. Fundamentally, the complexity revealed by the framework makes clear that a 
portfolio of theories is essential. Diversity of theoretical approaches should be encouraged, but to provide 
valid insights, each approach must recognize the complexity of the phenomenon even if it seeks to 
explain only a part of it. In our view, any theory of TBGI should take into account the following features 
of governance interactions and justify its focus within and among them: 
1. The multiplicity of interacting entities and scales of interaction; 
2. The co-evolution of agency and structure; 
3. The multiple components of regulatory governance; 
4. The intermediate position of interaction as both influence and outcome; 
5. The diverse modes of interaction; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
37 Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 34–6. 
38 Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 626. 
39 Eberlein (n 7). 
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6. The mechanisms and pathways of interaction; and  
7. The development of interaction over time and space.  
These criteria are derived from our analytical framework, especially from the six features of interaction 
described above (interacting entities, drivers, mechanisms/pathways, character, effects, and temporal 
dynamics). Previously, we articulated these features mainly in terms of descriptive taxonomies.40 Now, 
we elaborate deeper criteria for theory building. These criteria reflect substantive features of TBGI, not 
abstract attributes of theory such as verifiability, parsimony or robustness, which are also important. We 
take up these criteria in turn below, applying them to the special issue articles and to selected elements of 
the transnational legal literature. 
3.1  Multiplicity of Entities and Scales 
Any theoretical account of transnational governance interactions must specify who or what 
interacts.41 The special issue articles and legal literature identify numerous candidates, from individuals to 
social systems and from regulatory instruments to discourses. Choosing among these is an exercise in 
theory in which the researcher posits the nature of the interacting elements and specifies relevant units 
and levels of analysis. TBGI researchers should do this in a way that recognizes the heterogeneity of 
interacting entities, the often fuzzy and contingent character of their boundaries, the frequent multiplicity 
of their regulatory roles and the multi-scalar character of many of their interactions.  
Many interacting entities are actors, such as individuals, governments, civil society organisations 
and business firms or associations. Individuals can play important roles as boundary-crossing norm 
entrepreneurs. Organisations are inherently complex, functioning simultaneously as actors and as arenas 
for interaction by individuals or other organisations.42  
Norms, instruments, and discourses also interact, as do regulatory schemes, regimes, systems and 
cultures. Their boundaries are even less clearly defined. Entities like these are both products of social 
action and social structures in which actions are embedded. Entities such as networks, epistemic 
communities and social movements exhibit characteristics of both actors and structures. No theory can 
encompass all actors, norms and social structures, but theories should recognize the heterogeneity of 
interacting entities and their roles.  
Some illustrations from the legal literature show that there are many ways for theorists to 
accomplish this. Transnational legal process theory emphasizes interaction among norm entrepreneurs to 
articulate or interpret norms that guide future interactions, ultimately reconstituting actors’ interests and 
identities.43 Gregory Shaffer and Terence Halliday’s transnational legal orders project examines 
interactions within the normative structure of transnational law (including legitimacy, clarity and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
40 Eberlein (n 7). 
41 Eberlein (n 7) 8. 
42 Hancher and Moran suggest that the most important regulatory interactions are between organisations. Leigh 
Hancher and Michael Moran, ‘Organizing Regulatory Space’ in Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran (eds), 
Capitalism, Culture and Regulation (Clarendon, 1989). 
43 Eg Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process’ (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181; Harold Hongju Koh, 
‘Internalization through Socialization’ (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 975. 
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coherence), within national legal systems and between the two.44 Liberal theories posit multi-level 
interactions among state, interstate, sub-state and non-state actors,45 while rational-institutionalist theories 
of legalization combine interaction among actors and norms to explain the transnational spread of 
distinctively legal features.46 Public international lawyers address interactions through concepts such as 
fragmentation,47 ‘hard-soft’ law interaction,48 and ‘trade and …’ conflicts.49 Regime complexity theory 
examines actor strategies within regime complexes.50 These approaches remain primarily focused on 
state-based governance. 
Other approaches emphasize non-state actors and institutions, including interactions between 
interstate and non-state law.51 Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal locate interactions among diverse 
actors and institutions on a ‘governance triangle’ formed by the state, business and civil society.52 Abbott 
also applies regime complexity theory to non-state governance.53 Theories of transnational private 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
44 Gregory Shaffer, ‘The Dimensions and Determinants of State Change’ in Gregory Shaffer (ed), Transnational 
Legal Ordering and State Change (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 23; see also Terrence C Halliday and 
Gregory Shaffer (eds), Transnational Legal Orders (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
45 Eg Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ (1995) 6 European Journal of 
International Law 503; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Liberal Theories of International Law,’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark 
A Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of The 
Art (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 83. 
46 Eg Kenneth W Abbott and others, ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54 International Organization 401; 
Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Law, Legalization and Politics: An Agenda for the Next Generation of 
IL/IR Scholars’ in Dunoff and Pollack, ibid, 33. 
47 Eg Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Post-Modern Anxieties’ (2002) 15 
Leiden Journal of International Law 553; Margaret A Young (ed), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing 
Fragmentation (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Harro van Asselt, The Fragmentation of Global Climate 
Governance: Consequences and Management of Regime Interactions (Edward Elgar, 2014). 
48 Eg Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54 
International Organization 421; John J Kirton and Michael J Trebilcock (eds), Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary 
Standards in Global Trade, Environment, and Social Governance (Ashgate, 2004); Gregory Shaffer and Mark 
Pollack, ‘Hard vs Soft: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in International Governance’ (2010) 94 
Minnesota Law Review 706.  
49 Eg David W Leebron, ‘Linkages’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 5; Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of 
Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
50 Eg Kal Raustiala and David G Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’ (2004) 58 
International Organization 277; Laurence R Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property 
System’ (2009) 7(1) Perspectives on Politics 39; Kal Raustiala, ‘Institutional Proliferation and the International 
Legal Order’ in Dunoff and Pollack (n 45) 293, 294.  
51 Eg Hanneke van Schooten and Jonathan Verschuuren (eds), International Governance and Law: State Regulation 
and Non-State Law (Edward Elgar, 2008); Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert (eds), Non-State Actor Dynamics 
in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law-Makers (Ashgate, 2010). 
52 Kenneth W Abbot and Duncan Snidal, ‘The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the 
Shadow of the State’ in Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton 
University Press, 2009) 44. 
53 Kenneth W Abbott, ‘The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2012) 30 Environment and 
Planning C: Government and Policy 571; Kenneth W Abbott, ‘Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex 
for Climate Change’ (2014) 3 Transnational Environmental Law 57.  
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regulation capture interactions within deterritorialized regulatory regimes,54 but typically overlook inter-
regime interactions, with notable exceptions including accounts of transnational meta-regulation.55 
Transgovernmental approaches explore cross-border interactions among courts, legislatures, regulatory 
agencies, subnational governments and international secretariats, often via networks.56  Others examine 
the crucial role of intermediaries such as lawyers.57 Comparative law has developed potentially fruitful 
analytical frameworks that combine the interaction of norm entrepreneurs, communities, legal structures 
and technological systems to explain legal transplantation and norm diffusion.58  
Contemporary theories of regulation and ‘new governance’ examine bargaining and 
intermediation among individuals and organisations that span the public-private divide.59 John 
Braithwaite and Peter Drahos consider interactions among actors (individuals, organisations and states), 
normative principles and regulatory webs.60 Theories of international regulatory competition and co-
opetition emphasize interactions between national legal systems61 but bring non-state actors in to a certain 
degree.62 In a similar vein, theories of multi-level governance involve horizontal, vertical and ‘diagonal’ 
interactions among actors and jurisdictions at different scales.63 Robert Ahdieh’s concept of dialectical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
54 Eg Harm Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating 
Markets (Hart, 2005). 
55 Eg Jacco Bomhoff and Anne Meuwese, ‘The Meta-Regulation of Transnational Private Regulation’ (2011) 38 
Journal of Law and Society 138; Colin Scott, ‘Beyond Taxonomies of Private Authority in Private Regulation’ 
(2012) 13 German Law Journal 1329. 
56 Eg Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘The Accountability of Government Networks’ (2001) 8 Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 347; Kal Raustiala, ‘The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and 
the Future of International Law’ (2002) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 1; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New 
World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 
44(1) Harvard International Law Journal 191. 
57 Eg Yves Dezalay and Bryant G Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (University of Chicago Press, 1996); Yves Dezalay and Bryant G 
Garth (eds), Lawyers and the Rule of Law in an Era of Globalization (Routledge, 2011). 
58 Eg Katharina Pistor, ‘Of Legal Transplants, Legal Irritants, and Economic Development’ in Peter Cornelius and 
Bruce Kogut (eds), Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy (Oxford University Press, 2003) 
347. 
59 Eg Julia Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation, Part I’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 597; Julia Black, 
‘Proceduralizing Regulation, Part II’ (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33; Julia Black, ‘Decentring 
Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World’ (2001) 
54 Current Legal Problems 103; Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002); Scott (n 28); Orly Lobel, ‘The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the 
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342; John Braithwaite, 
Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas for Making It Work Better (Edward Elgar, 2008).  
60 Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15). 
61 Eg William Bratton and others (eds), International Regulatory Competition and Coordination: Perspectives on 
Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States (Clarendon, 1996). 
62 Eg Daniel C Esty and Damien Geradin, ‘Regulatory Co-opetition’ in Daniel C Esty and Damien Geradin (eds), 
Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration (Oxford University Press, 2001); Damien Geradin and Joseph A 
McCahery, ‘Regulatory Co-opetition: Transcending the Regulatory Competition Debate’ in Jacint Jordana and 
David Levi-Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance 
(Edward Elgar, 2004) 90, 112–14. 
63 Eg Hari M Osofsky, ‘The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational Regulatory 
Governance’ (2005) 83 Washington University Law Quarterly 1789; Robert A Schapiro, ‘From Dualist Federalism 
to Interactive Federalism’ (2006) 56 Emory Law Journal 1 (introduction to special issue on interactive federalism); 
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regulation focuses on inter-systemic interactions,64 while experimentalist governance involves recursive 
interactions among central and decentralized units of various kinds.65 
Some transnational legal pluralists examine interactions among legal orders or cultures,66 others 
among structural sites and strategic actors.67 In Santos’s conception of interlegality, hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic legalities interact in collisions among ‘rival normative ideas, knowledges, power 
forms, symbolic universes and agencies’.68 Oren Perez studies interactions among state-based, non-state 
and hybrid organisations and regimes within a ‘complex discursive labyrinth’.69 Gralf-Peter Calliess and 
Peer Zumbansen’s theory of ‘rough consensus and running code’ involves interactions between actors and 
social structures, including norms, regimes, cultures and spaces.70 Finally, at the structural end of the 
agency-structure continuum, Gunther Teubner’s systems theory involves interaction among 
autopoietically closed social subsystems, including formal organisations and functionally differentiated 
societal subsystems.71 
Halliday and Shaffer contend that the boundaries between interacting legal orders are fixed by 
discourses, ideological frames, subjective perceptions, alliances and conflicts.72 These elements are 
contestable and hard to measure, however. The fuzzy, permeable and contingent character of interacting 
entities can raise difficult issues of individuation, since ‘interaction is often more like that between waves 
or clouds or rivulets than between hard, stable entities like rocks or billiard balls’.73 Similar considerations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Hari M Osofsky, ‘Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation's Diagonal Regulatory Role’ (2009) 49 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 585 (2009). 
64 Robert B Ahdieh, ‘Dialectical Regulation’ (2006) 38 Connecticut Law Review 863; see also Robert A Schapiro, 
‘Federalism as Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in a Post-Westphalian World’ (2007) 57 Emory Law Journal 
115; Paul Schiff Berman, ‘Dialectical Regulation, Territoriality, and Pluralism’ (2006) 38 Connecticut Law Review 
929. 
65 Charles F Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Experimentalist Governance’ in David Levi-Faur (ed) The Oxford 
Handbook of Governance (Oxford University Press, 2012) 169; Christine Overdevest and Jonathan Zeitlin, 
‘Assembling an Experimentalist Regime: Transnational Governance Interactions in the Forest Sector’ (2014) 8 
Regulation and Governance 22.  
66 Eg Sally Falk Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of 
Study’ (1973) 7 Law and Society Review 719; John Griffiths, ‘What Is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1; Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 869; 
Ralph Grillo, Roger Ballard, Alessandro Ferrari, André J Hoekema, Marcel Maussen and Prakash Shah (eds), Legal 
Practice and Cultural Diversity (Ashgate, 2009).  
67 Eg Francis G Snyder, ‘Governing Globalisation,’ in Michael Likosky (ed), Transnational Legal Processes: 
Globalisation and Power Disparities (Butterworths, 2002) 65. 
68 Santos, New Legal Common Sense (n 36) 472. 
69 Oren Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism: Rethinking the Trade and Environment Conflict 
(Hart, 2004) 259; see also Oren Perez, ‘Private Environmental Governance as Ensemble Regulation: A Critical 
Exploration of Sustainability Indexes and the New Ensemble Politics’ (2011) 12 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 543. 
70 Calliess and Zumbansen (n 34). 
71 Eg Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System, Anne Bankowska and Ruth Adler (trans), (Blackwell, 1993); 
Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999. 
72 Halliday and Shaffer (n 44) 3, 30–31. 
73 William Twining, “Diffusion and Globalization Discourse” (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 507, 
513. 
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lead Fleur Johns to urge scholars to focus on the ‘hyphen’ between intersecting legal orders: the shifting 
spaces in which legal systems are constituted mutually by their encounters with one another.74  
Another important feature of interactions is the multiplicity of regulatory roles that actors often 
perform simultaneously. A business firm, for example, might implement standards and participate in 
standard-setting; a transnational governance scheme might set standards and also be subject to meta-rules. 
In short, transnational business governance involves ‘many kinds of actors which regulate while being 
regulated themselves’.75   
Finally, theoretical accounts of TBGI should recognize that interaction frequently occurs at and 
across multiple scales. Micro-level analyses examine how individual actors (people or organisations) 
interact within a regulatory scheme or jurisdiction to create, implement or enforce standards. Much of the 
theoretical literature on regulation,76 especially transnational private regulation,77 follows this approach, 
examining interactions among rule makers, targets, interpreters, enforcers or beneficiaries. Meso-level 
analyses examine how regulatory jurisdictions or schemes interact, in regimes or organisational fields, 
and how norms, discourses, cultures and other institutions enable and constrain action.78 Finally, macro-
level analyses explore how entire regimes or organisational fields intersect within larger complexes79 or 
systems,80 and how the latter entities interact with one another.  
We argue elsewhere that meso-level analyses are initially the most fruitful, because they provide 
‘sufficient abstraction to identify patterns and trends, without sacrificing empirical detail’.81 Yet we do 
not advocate an exclusive meso-level focus. Interactions often link different levels; they may occur 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
74 Fleur Johns, ‘International Law-National Law: Thinking through the Hyphen’ in Hilary Charlesworth et al (eds), 
The Fluid State: International Law and National Legal Systems (Federation Press, 2005) 188; see also Janne Nijman 
and André Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
75 Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 10. 
76 Eg Robert W Hahn and Roger G Noll, ‘Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollution Permits: Problems 
of Regulatory Interactions’ (1983) 1 Yale Journal on Regulation 63; Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992); Anthony Ogus, Regulation: 
Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart, 2004); On Amir and Orly Lobel, ‘Liberalism and Lifestyle: Informing 
Regulatory Governance with Behavioural Research’ (2012) 3 European Journal of Risk Regulation 17.  
77 Eg Special Issue, The Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation: Conceptual and Constitutional Debates 
(2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 1; Fabrizio Cafaggi (ed), Enforcement of Transnational Regulation: Ensuring 
Compliance in a Global World (Edward Elgar, 2012); Special Issue, Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: 
Regimes, Dialogue, Constitutionalization (2012) 13 German Law Journal 1269; Geoffrey P Miller and Fabrizio 
Cafaggi (eds), The Governance and Regulation of International Finance (Edward Elgar, 2013). 
78 Eg Errol Meidinger, ‘Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline’ (1987) 9 Law and Policy 355; John and Valerie 
Braithwaite, ‘The Politics of Legalism: Rules versus Standards in Nursing-Home Regulation,’ (1995) 4 Social & 
Legal Studies 307; Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (Clarendon, 1997); Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really 
Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 59. 
79 Eg Laurence R Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking’ (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law 1; Raustiala and Victor (n 50); Laurence R 
Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System’ (2009) 7(1) Perspectives on Politics 39; 
Raustiala, ‘Institutional Proliferation’ (n 50) 293; Abbott, ‘The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ 
(n 53); Abbott, ‘Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (n 53). 
80 Eg Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (n 71); Doorey, this issue. 
81 Eberlein (n 7) 8. 
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simultaneously within a regulatory scheme (micro) and with other schemes (meso). Moreover, 
interactions frequently cut across geographic scales, from local to global. A fruitful theoretical portfolio 
should encompass the micro and meso levels, the meso and macro levels, or all three.  
Table 1 provisionally (and contestably) locates a range of theoretical approaches on the 
continuum of scale. Strikingly, most approaches either squarely address the meso level or straddle that 
level and one or both of the others. This accords with our own recommendation and provides the basis for 
a fruitful theoretical portfolio.  
Turning to the articles in this special issue, John Biggins and Colin Scott do not theorize 
interacting entities explicitly, but their account of TBGI in the field of financial derivatives is squarely 
actor-centred. Biggins and Scott focus on interactions among the key organisations involved in over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives regulation before and after the global financial crisis, including the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), financial regulators, courts and financial firms. 
They examine simultaneous micro-level interactions within ISDA and meso-level interactions between 
ISDA and other organisations. These interactions cut across geographic scales, as between the global 
ISDA Master Agreement and national laws. Their case study invites further theorization of these 
interactions. 
Karin Buhmann’s study of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights identifies a 
wide range of interacting entities, including organisations (eg UN Human Rights Council), societal 
segments (eg civil society), individuals (eg John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General on business and human rights (‘SRSG’)), regulatory schemes (eg the UN Guiding Principles, UN 
Global Compact, OECD Guidelines, and national laws). Buhmann’s focus on relationships among 
regulatory instruments is particularly intriguing.  
	   14	  
	  
Table	  1.	  Micro-­‐,	  meso-­‐	  and	  macro-­‐level	  theoretical	  perspectives	  on	  governance	  interactions	  
Level	  of	  
analysis/scale	  
of	  interaction	  
Micro	  
(Individual	  actors	  interact	  
within	  a	  given	  jurisdiction	  or	  
scheme)	  	  
Meso	  
(Jurisdictions	  or	  schemes	  
interact	  within	  regimes	  or	  
fields;	  regimes,	  fields	  and	  
discourses	  shape	  actors)	  
Macro	  
(Regimes	  or	  fields	  interact	  
within	  complexes	  or	  systems;	  
complexes	  or	  systems	  interact	  
with	  one	  another)	  
Examples	  of	  
theoretical	  
perspectives	  
Public	  and	  private	  interest	  
theories	  of	  regulation	  
Social	  norms	  
Enrolment	  
Fragmentation	  of	  
international	  law	  
Orchestration	  
Legalisation	  
Institutional	  theories	  of	  
regulation	  
Regulatory	  competition,	  co-­‐
opetition	  
Multilevel	  governance	  
Ensemble	  regulation	  
	  
Micro	  and	  meso	  
International/transnational	  legal	  process	  
Transnational	  legal	  orders	  
Constructivist	  international	  
relations/international	  law	  theory	  
Liberal	  international	  relations/international	  
law	  theory	  
Transgovernmental	  networks	  
(Transnational)	  private	  regulation	  
Experimentalist	  governance	  
(Global)	  legal	  pluralism	  
Rough	  Consensus,	  Running	  Code	  
Meso	  and	  macro	  
Regime	  complexity	  
Interlegality	  
Micro,	  meso	  and	  macro	  
Global	  business	  regulation	  
Systems	  theory	  
 
It is not always clear in this analysis who or what is interacting. In our terms, however, Buhmann 
offers a micro-level analysis of interactions at the rule formation stage, focusing on the SRSG’s 
enrollment of private and public actors. Later, she presents a meso-level analysis of interactions between 
the UN Guiding Principles and other programs at the implementation stage, with a focus on mutual 
‘piggy-backing’ by these programs to enhance their legitimacy and effectiveness. Her account shows that 
scales of interaction and analysis can shift as activity moves from one component of the regulatory 
process to another. It also invites theoretical attention to the relations among actors, instruments, 
institutions and discourses. 
Kernaghan Webb also identifies a variety of interacting entities in his study of the International 
Organisation for Standardization’s ISO 26000 social responsibility guidance standard. These include 
organisations (eg ISO and other instrument developers), individuals (eg Working Group experts), 
regulatory instruments (eg ISO 9000 and 14001; ILO Core Conventions), norms (eg due diligence and 
Plan-Do-Check-Act), issue areas (eg labour, human rights and environment) and societal sectors (public, 
private and civil society). While Webb paints a rich picture, it is again not always clear which of these are 
interacting at any specific point.  
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Webb’s account shows that interactions can occur and be analyzed simultaneously at the micro, 
meso and macro levels. It also indicates, like Buhmann’s, that the nature and scale of interaction can shift 
across regulatory governance components. At the rule formation stage, Webb traces a combination of 
micro-level interactions within ISO and meso-level interactions between ISO and competitor 
organisations. At the implementation stage, he describes meso-level interactions among ISO, states and 
business actors to solidify ISO 26000’s status as a global custom, and macro-level interactions between 
this custom and domestic legal systems.  
Webb also shows ISO to be a multi-level, multi-scalar arena for interaction. First, ISO is a meta-
organisation of national standards bodies and international organisations. As a result, it is a powerful 
convener; interactions between ISO and other standard-setters occur both outside and within ISO, blurring 
the line between micro and meso. Second, ISO standards are drafted by individual experts acting in a 
personal capacity, while standards are approved by national standards organisations. Third, ISO is the 
pinnacle of a deep and broad standardization infrastructure spanning subnational, national and 
transnational spheres. Fourth, in developing ISO 26000, ISO organised experts into stakeholder 
categories, encouraging transnational collaboration within and between them. The process thus 
encompassed diverse cross-actor and cross-scale interactions. It would be fascinating to theorize these 
features, identify other organisations where they appear and investigate their role in TBGI.  
David Doorey is alone among the authors in this special issue in devoting substantial attention to 
theory development. He identifies two categories of interacting entities in the development of a living 
wage norm in transnational codes of conduct for supply chains: organisations and social subsystems. He 
first examines interactions among diverse NGOs, labour unions, firms, trade associations, governments, 
and standards schemes within a TBG social subsystem. Doorey emphasizes heterogeneity within as well 
as between categories and even individual actors. He also examines interactions between the TBG 
subsystem and other subsystems in its environment.  
Doorey develops a model of TBGI grounded in the theory of open systems. His model links the 
micro-level of interaction (among individuals, NGOs and firms) to the meso-level (among transnational 
regulatory schemes) and the macro-level (between societal subsystems). Here again, the scale of 
interaction shifts over time: from micro-level, conflictual interactions between NGOs and business; to 
meso-level competition between TBG schemes; and to multi-level interactions that facilitated the spread 
of the living wage norm from NGO-led to business-led schemes. Macro-level interactions among social 
subsystems conditioned all these interactions.   
Doorey’s individuation of the TBG subsystem raises some questions. Treating it as a single, 
functionally autonomous system might obscure both its in-between-ness82 and its internal heterogeneity.83 
This limitation notwithstanding, Doorey’s model provides one possible answer to the theoretical 
challenge of capturing the multi-scalar and multi-level character of governance interactions. 
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83 By contrast, Calliess and Zumbansen (n 34) identify numerous subsystems in the general space of transnational 
business governance. 
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3.2 Co-evolution of Agency and Structure 
Theoretical frameworks that focus only on structural features such as institutions, discourses, 
cultures, technological systems or social systems without attending to actors and their interests and 
resources, or that analyze strategic action in isolation from the social structures in which it occurs, will 
fail to grasp all the dynamics of governance interactions. Structural elements help constitute actors’ 
identities and possibilities for action, and are in turn constituted, reproduced and transformed by actors’ 
actions. Whether a theoretical perspective emphasizes agency or structure, therefore, it should recognize 
this mutual constitution and co-evolution.  
Theories that emphasize reflexivity, co-evolution and mutual interaction between agency and 
structure will have particularly strong purchase. This includes most institutionalist, experimentalist, socio-
legal, pluralist and legal-process approaches described above.84 It also includes constructivist theories of 
international law, which assume the mutual construction of social structures and actors’ identities and 
choices.85 In Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope’s interactional theory, for example, normative structures 
are constructed, reproduced and transformed via interaction between intersubjective norm-creation and 
actors’ ongoing practices of legality.86  
Other approaches to the agency-structure challenge can also be valuable. Consider the two 
theoretical perspectives in the bottom row of Table 1; both engage micro-, meso- and macro-level 
interactions simultaneously, yet offer contrasting perspectives on agency-structure interaction.  
Braithwaite and Drahos seek to explain how micro-level actions ‘constitute structural change, just 
as those micro processes are constituted and constrained’ by macro structures.87  They theorize micro-
macro sequences of regulatory globalization in which entrepreneurs promote a regulatory innovation and 
enrol organisational power via webs of dialogue. The innovation spreads through modeling, eventually 
becoming a standard.88 Braithwaite and Drahos also theorize a forum-shifting sequence.89 In our terms, 
this is a meso-level phenomenon in which an actor moves a regulatory agenda from one forum to another, 
abandons a forum, pursues an agenda in multiple fora or blocks a forum from acting.90  
Forum-shifting is used by a range of state and non-state actors.91 Business groups’ creation of 
their own forestry certification schemes to divert the forest certification agenda away from the multi-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
84 See Wood (n 8) for a detailed discussion. 
85 Eg Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge University Press, 1989); Ian Johnstone, The Power of 
Deliberation: International Law, Politics and Organizations (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
86 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, ‘International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory 
of International Law’ (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 19; Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, 
Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
87 Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 14. 
88 Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 33, 551, 559–62. 
89 Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 564, 569–71. 
90 Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 29, 564. 
91 Eg Laurence R Helfer, ‘Forum Shopping for Human Rights’ (1999) 148 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
285. 
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stakeholder Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is an example.92 More recently, the FSC and its main 
industry-led competitor failed in a joint bid to block ISO from taking up the sustainable forestry 
standardization agenda,93 while consumer and business interests succeeded in making ISO an alternative 
to the ILO as a forum for developing global labour-related standards.94 A closely related strategy of 
institutional bypass has been used by non-state actors to get around intergovernmental fora.95 Forum-
shifting and institutional bypass are promising strategies by which micro- or meso-level interaction can 
produce macro-level change. 
While Braithwaite and Drahos recognize the co-evolution of agency and structure, their account 
is fundamentally actor-centred.96 They insist that ‘explanation is not indissolubly linked to social 
systems’, and they ‘take seriously the intentionality of agents and the ways in which their beliefs and 
desires can lead them to change their regulatory worlds’.97 This has the advantage of clearly identifying 
the drivers of regulatory interaction (goal-seeking agency). Yet there are also other potentially fruitful 
avenues for investigation, including interactions among norms, discourses or social systems; logics of 
contradiction, juxtaposition and contingency; and uncalculated interactions such as institutional 
isomorphism.98  
Teubner’s theory of autopoietically closed systems offers a contrasting perspective on the agency-
structure relationship.99 Although this theory might appear to offer a purely macro-level analysis, it 
actually spans all three levels. Interaction takes place between societal subsystems (macro) and between 
organisations (micro and meso). Every attempt to regulate an organisation involves inter-systemic 
interaction; all inter-systemic interactions must pass through the ‘eye of the needle’ of individual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
92 The main industry-led umbrella scheme, the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC), 
boasts a much larger total certified area despite having been created six years after the FSC and despite strong 
endorsement of the FSC by many civil society groups and academics (though the FSC’s total certified area is 
growing at a quicker rate). See generally Benjamin Cashore, Graeme Auld and Deanna Newsom, Governing 
Through Markets: Forest Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority (Yale University Press, 2004) 9–
17; Overdevest (n 18). For growth in total certified area, see United Nations Environment Program, Towards a 
Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication (UNEP, 2011) 136.  
93 Joint Statement by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest 
Certification (PEFC) recommending ISO members to vote against the New Work Item Proposal Chain of Custody of 
Forest Based Products-Requirements (8 July 2013, copy on file with authors). 
94 Namely, ISO 26000 (social responsibility) and ISO 45001 (occupational health and safety). This development 
challenges Braithwaite and Drahos’s conclusion ((n15) 567, 572–4) that the ILO’s tripartite structure deters forum-
shifting. Whether forum-shifting to ISO will undermine or strengthen the ILO remains to be seen. For a pessimistic 
assessment see Janelle M Diller, ‘Private Standardization in Public International Lawmaking’ (2012) 33 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 481. On ISO generally see Stepan Wood, ‘The International Organization for 
Standardization’ in Darryl Reed, Peter Utting and Ananya Mukherjee-Reed, Business Regulation and Non-State 
Actors: Whose Standards? Whose Development? (Routledge, 2012) 81.  
95 Steven J Hoffman and John-Arne Røttingen, ‘Dark Sides of the Proposed Framework Convention on Global 
Health’s Many Virtues: A Systematic Review and Critical Analysis’ (2013) 15(1) Health and Human Rights 117. 
96 Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 9, 16, 528–30. 
97 Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 17. 
98 Eg Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (n 71); John Law and John Hassard (eds), Actor Network Theory and 
After (Blackwell, 1999); Pierre Schlag, ‘The Aesthetics of American Law’ (2002) 115 Harvard Law Review 1047; 
Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’État (Polity, 2010).  
99 For a detailed discussion, see Wood (n 8). 
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communicative events.100 Teubner’s interactive mechanisms of blind co-evolution, information and 
interference101 operate simultaneously at all three levels. But autonomous human agents take a back seat. 
Social systems are constituted by communications, not by human beings.102 The theory of autopoietic 
systems thus offers a radically limited account of the co-evolution of agency and structure. 
Doorey’s use of open systems theory offers an alternative. It combines macro-level interactions 
among social subsystems with micro-level interactions among individuals and organisations. Within the 
TBG subsystem, actors interact via varied pathways and mechanisms to produce regulatory rules and 
behavioural change. Internal feedback loops link these outputs back to actors, while external feedback 
loops link them to economic, legal and other subsystems, which in turn provide inputs to the TBG 
subsystem.103 The co-evolution of agency and structure is central to Doorey’s model. Alignment or 
conflict among actors’ goals, values and risk perceptions is a powerful driver of interaction, but actors’ 
characteristics—and the choices available to them—evolve in response to structural forces. This approach 
suggests the possibility of breaking open the ‘black box’ of actor characteristics and examining their 
relation to social structures.104 
Calliess and Zumbansen’s Rough Consensus and Running Code (RCRC) offers another systems 
theory-inspired perspective. On one hand, the fragmentation of society into autonomous, functionally 
differentiated, law-creating subsystems with competing rationalities creates the structures that shape 
actors’ identities and possibilities for action (macro).105 On the other hand, actors’ interactions generate 
the rough consensus that congeals into a subsystem’s running code and drives its continual evolution 
(micro).106 The RCRC model provides a promising theoretical frame for analyzing interactions among 
actors, norms and social structures.  
Turning to other articles in this special issue, Biggins and Scott hint at a subtle relationship 
between the ISDA and market-wide institutional structures. For example, the Master Agreement and 
close-out netting procedures devised by ISDA were adopted so widely that they became part of the 
institutional structure of the derivatives market. As such, they helped moderate the global financial crisis 
in that market, leading powerful states to enhance ISDA’s agency further.  
Buhmann hints at another agency-structure relationship. By combining an actor-centred 
negotiation history with discourse analysis, she illustrates the mutual construction of small-scale agency 
and large-scale discursive structures, including the strategic deployment of discourse to influence 
action.107 Theorizing these agency-structure interactions would be a welcome next step. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
100 Gunther Teubner, ‘Evolution of Autopoietic Law’ in Gunther Teubner (ed), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to 
Law and Society (Walter de Gruyter, 1988) 217, 236.  
101 See Wood (n 8). 
102 Gunther Teubner, ‘Introduction to Autopoietic Law’ in Teubner, Autopoietic Law (n 100) 1, 3. 
103 See Figure 1 in Doorey, this issue, for a depiction of the entire system. 
104 Doorey, ibid. 
105 Calliess and Zumbansen (n 34) 44–50. 
106 Calliess and Zumbansen (n 34) 135–6. We nonetheless place this theory in the micro-meso cell of Table 1 
because the authors focus almost entirely on these levels. 
107 Buhmann, this issue. 
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3.3 The Components of Regulatory Governance 
 Our analytical framework identifies six components of regulatory governance: agenda-setting, 
norm formation, implementation, monitoring, enforcement and review.108 Whatever theoretical 
frameworks they apply, researchers should recognize that regulatory governance has such components, 
and that interactions can occur within any of them. This divisibility also invites theory development. Each 
component ‘demands a different portfolio of resources or capacities, including financial resources, 
organisational capacity, expertise, legitimacy, and strategic position’.109 Each can, moreover, involve 
different actors and display distinct interactive dynamics, as Buhmann and Webb show.110  
Much of the legal literature examines only one or two components, most commonly norm 
formation111 and enforcement (adjudication).112 Margaret Young, Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel are 
among the scholars calling for attention to a broader range of regulatory processes.113 Analyzing 
interactive dynamics within and among different components will be a valuable area of theory building.  
The articles in this issue illustrate the opportunities. Scott has elsewhere emphasized the 
importance of looking beyond standard-setting in transnational private regulation,114 and he and Biggins 
do so in their article. They trace how interactions expanded from agenda-setting and norm formation to 
implementation and enforcement. Interactions in agenda-setting and rule formation included micro-level 
bargaining among dealer banks to produce the ISDA Master Agreement and meso-level interaction in 
which ISDA drafted and governments enacted OTC derivatives-friendly legislation. Here the outputs of 
micro-level interactions (boilerplate contracts) were inputs to meso-level interactions, reinforcing ISDA’s 
lobbying for self-regulation. Once the ISDA self-regulatory regime achieved global dominance, 
governments implicitly endowed it with additional interpretative and adjudicative responsibilities, 
exercised mainly by newly formed credit derivatives determination committees (DCs). DCs have unusual 
significance because of their impact on the financial positions of states and their creditors.   
Buhmann discusses all six components of regulatory governance, showing how the nature and 
scale of interaction change as activities shift from one component to another. During agenda-setting, 
micro-level interactions within the UN human rights apparatus evolved from competition to coordination. 
During rule formation, micro and meso interactions blended together, shifting to cooptation and meta-
regulation as the UN Guiding Principles achieved dominance. During implementation, the focus shifted 
again, to meso-level mutual ‘piggy-backing’ by the UN Guiding Principles and other programs. 
Doorey’s article illustrates how conflict during rule formation (over defining a living wage) can 
be diverted into cooperation at the implementation stage (where experimentation with implementation 
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109 Eberlein (n 7). 
110 See above, Part 2.1. 
111 Eg Calliess and Zumbansen (n 34). 
112 Eg Jessup (n 1). 
113 Margaret A Young, ‘Introduction: The Productive Friction Between Regimes’ in Young (n 47) 1; Robert Howse 
and Ruti Teitel, ‘Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Matters’ (2010) 1 Global Policy 127. 
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strategies led to agreement on a ‘wage ladder’ approach). It also indicates, however, that the result may be 
merely to defer rather than to resolve conflict.  
Webb’s study invites theorization on two points. First, the same interactions may affect multiple 
components of regulation simultaneously. For example, interactions over implementation of ISO 26000 
occur partly within state and interstate norm development processes. One scheme’s implementation may 
thus be another’s norm formation, involving similar actors and interactions. Second, the article suggests 
that organisations’ pre-existing legitimacy endowments influence interactions across multiple 
components. ISO’s legitimacy as a global standards-setter facilitated its assertion of authority over social 
responsibility (SR) standards at the agenda-setting stage. During norm development, it allowed ISO to 
steer competition with rival SR standard-setters into co-opetition within ISO. During implementation, the 
widespread acceptance of the ISO management systems standards on which ISO 26000 was modelled 
facilitated business uptake of the new standard.  
 In sum, scholars of TBGI should turn their attention to theorizing interactions within and across 
the components of regulatory governance. Important questions for theory development include whether 
particular components have peculiar interaction dynamics; whether those dynamics change when 
interactions relate simultaneously to multiple components; how interactions in one component influence 
those in another; how linkages between components can be exploited to manage regulatory interactions; 
where feedback loops are likely to emerge; and how organisational legitimacy endowments influence 
interactions throughout the regulatory governance process. 
3.4 The Intermediate Position of Interaction 
 Theories of transnational governance interaction must recognize that interactions occupy a dual 
position. On one hand, they are the results of conditions, forces and actions that influence who or what 
will interact, when and how. On the other hand, interactions affect the design of regulatory institutions, 
the nature and content of regulation, the perceptions and behaviour of regulated actors, and other 
downstream conditions.  
 A range of factors drives interaction.115 Actor-level drivers include alignment or conflict of goals, 
perceptions and interests, and overlapping scope of activity.116 System-level drivers include functional 
differentiation of society into subsystems with different logics;117 duplication or inconsistency of rules;118 
and governance gaps created by globalization and the transformation of the state.119 Other relevant factors 
include problem structure,120 industry structure,121 technical systems,122 discursive structures and cultures.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
115 Eberlein (n 7) 9–10. 
116 Eg Doorey, this issue. 
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Turning to effects, the ultimate goal of our research agenda is to explain and predict the impacts 
of governance interactions on social, political and environmental conditions.123 However, such impacts 
are very difficult to determine, given the complexity of causal and other relations and the multiplicity of 
contributing factors beyond regulation (let alone regulatory interactions). These points have important 
implications for TBGI theory building. We focus here on two: choosing the object of inquiry and 
integrating drivers and effects.  
First, if it is not practicable to assess directly the social impacts of governance interactions, what 
is the most fruitful proxy? The most common alternatives are outputs and outcomes.124 Outputs of 
interaction include regulatory standards and institutional design features. Outcomes include changes in 
behaviour, values or perceptions. Ideally, scholars should seek to theorize how interactions affect the 
outputs and outcomes not only of single governance schemes but of entire governance regimes.  
 In studying outputs, theories of institutional isomorphism,125 norm diffusion126 and regulatory 
races127 are relevant. Of particular interest are theories explaining how races become ratchets. Braithwaite 
and Drahos argue that certain principles can combine to prevent reversal of a regulatory race’s direction, 
transforming a race into a ratchet.128 They theorize the conditions for this to occur and give numerous 
illustrations. Multiple ratchets are particularly powerful. In forestry, for example, principles of rule 
compliance and continuous improvement in national law, ISO 14001 and the FSC create multiple 
ratchets, each driving regulatory standards up and all of them together preventing backsliding.129   
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124 Arild Underdal, ‘Methodological Challenges in the Study of Regime Effectiveness’ in Arild Underdal and Oran 
R Young (eds), Regime Consequences: Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies (Kluwer, 2004) 27. 
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Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental 
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sustainable forestry standards, created by competition between the FSC and industry-led schemes. Abbott and 
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In addition to behavioural change, outcomes can include dialogue, information sharing, shared 
understandings, policy learning, and changed values, perceptions or expectations. They may also include 
heightened hostility or mistrust, As Doorey notes, such outcomes can emerge even without formal outputs 
such as rules.130  
We propose focusing on one outcome in particular: changes in the capacity of regulatory 
governance actors, schemes and systems.131 Scholars should investigate how interactions affect the 
mobilization of motivations, competences and resources along governance chains, and how capacities 
affect the performance of regulatory systems—in the narrow sense of making rules and shaping practices. 
The motivations, competences and resources that must be enrolled are controlled by a variety of actors, 
who may be unwilling or unable to contribute, leaving the regulatory system without essential capacities 
and jeopardizing its performance. 
Do interacting schemes reinforce one another and promote diverse solutions132 through 
innovation, experimentation, learning and adaptability?133 Or do they work at cross-purposes, facilitating 
forum-shopping for the least stringent rules?134 What conditions—eg, shared interests, goals and cognitive 
understandings—are associated with successful mobilization and orchestration of actors and resources? 
Bruno Latour’s concept of enrolment (the interactive process of mobilizing other actors and their 
resources in support of an actor’s regulatory goals) should be fruitful here.135 Yet questions remain, 
including which indicators of capacity to adopt, how to isolate the effects of interaction from other 
factors, and how to assess the independent effect of capacity constraints on regulatory performance. There 
is also a need to theorize the effects of interaction on governance capacity in deeper senses, including 
democracy, legitimacy, openness, transparency and accountability.136 
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A second challenge for theory is to integrate a backward-looking focus on the drivers of 
interaction with a forward-looking analysis of its effects. The phenomena they capture are closely 
intertwined in the regulatory process. Problem structure, for example, is both a background condition that 
shapes interaction and at least partly the product of discursive interaction.137 This challenge can be 
addressed in many ways, including applying a single theoretical frame to drivers and effects, and drawing 
on multiple theoretical tools to wrestle with drivers, effects or both.   
In this special issue, Biggins and Scott offer a functional account of the drivers of governance 
interactions in derivatives markets. Increasingly complex financial transactions and the liberalization of 
state regulation created a governance gap, prompting demand from market actors for coordination and 
sporadic pressure from states for industry self-regulation. The resulting interactions between state and 
industry actors had three main effects: the emergence of a hybrid public-private governance regime; 
ISDA’s consolidation as the dominant non-state regulator; and further enhancement of ISDA’s regulatory 
role following the global financial crisis.  
Drawing on Tim Büthe’s study of the International Electro-technical Commission,138 the authors 
explain ISDA’s dominance as a result of state support and ISDA’s neutralization of competitors, both 
explicitly interactive processes. They explain ISDA’s remarkable resilience as a result of industry 
structure. They endorse Daniel Mügge’s theory that industries dominated by highly organised producers 
can, despite exogenous shocks, define regulatory agendas and resist state intervention in complex areas by 
offering to tighten self-regulation in exchange for public oversight.139  
Governance interactions in the derivatives regime enhanced the regulatory capacities of both 
ISDA and states. ISDA was able to enroll states’ legislative and enforcement capacities in support of its 
regulatory agenda. State endorsement conferred legitimacy on ISDA and facilitated its dominance. For 
their part, states enrolled ISDA’s rulemaking and communication capacity to compensate for their limited 
expertise and legitimacy. The results are unstable, however. ISDA must walk a political tightrope 
between maximizing regulatory share and angering state policy makers, especially in systemically 
important areas like sovereign debt. 
Buhmann also offers a functionalist account of drivers, but points additionally to actors’ interests, 
values and perceptions. These can be manipulated, as with the SRSG’s discursive strategy of articulating 
stakeholders’ interests in cooperation, which amplified their drivers to interact. Buhmann also cites 
differences in geopolitics and in institutional locus and mandates to explain why interaction was more 
collaborative under the SRSG than previously.  
The effects of interaction at the agenda-setting stage were a shared understanding of the need for 
a transnational governance instrument on business and human rights; at the norm-formation stage, the 
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138 Büthe (n 12). 
139 Biggins and Scott, this issue, citing Daniel Mügge, ‘Private-Public Puzzles: Inter-firm Competition and 
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result was the UN Guiding Principles themselves; and at the implementation stage, the effects were 
normative homogenization and mutually enhanced regulatory capacity. In the face of member states’ 
reluctance to regulate business directly, the regulatory capacity of UN human rights organs was enhanced 
by enrolling non-state actors in rulemaking and by piggy-backing on other TBG schemes to complement 
the Principles’ limited implementation and enforcement modalities. The piggy-backing also worked in the 
other direction: the UN Human Rights Council’s endorsement of the Principles allowed other TBG 
initiatives that incorporated the Principles to expand their membership, audiences and regulatory space.   
In contrast to these functionalist accounts, the drivers of interaction in Doorey’s open systems 
model are actors’ goals, values, risk perceptions, power and capacity, which evolve in response to internal 
and external forces. Doorey’s main focus, however, is on the effects of interaction: the outputs and 
outcomes of the TBG subsystem. The main output was the transformation of the living wage norm from 
‘an outlier … to a norm found in most leading TBG schemes targeting global supply chain labour 
practices’.140 Despite this normative convergence, however, there is little evidence of behavioural change. 
Ironically, agreement on rules (outputs) is sometimes possible only because they require little behavioural 
change (outcomes). Finally, Doorey emphasizes the difficulty of measuring effects other than regulatory 
outputs, of isolating interactions from other causal variables, and of predicting whether interaction will 
have salutary or deleterious effects.  
Webb’s main contribution here is his examination, discussed above, of the effect of legitimacy 
endowments on the character and trajectory of interactions. This highlights the intertwined nature of 
drivers and effects. ISO’s legitimacy endowment enabled it to attract unprecedented participation by 
intergovernmental organs, which in turn conferred legitimacy on ISO 26000. Webb also emphasizes the 
importance of institutional design. He argues that ISO’s publicly accessible, transparent, multi-
stakeholder consensus process mitigated dominance by any one actor category, enhanced ISO 26000’s 
legitimacy, ensured that it genuinely approximated a global societal consensus, and facilitated widespread 
acceptance.  
3.5 Modes of Interaction 
 While some legal scholars, like Jessup, focus on a narrow range of interactions such as conflict, 
harmonization, or cooperation,141 many identify greater variety.142 Theoretical approaches should embrace 
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141 Eg Jessup (n 1) (conflict); Marianne Constable, ‘Afterword: Conflicts as a Law of Laws?’ (2008) 71:3 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 343 (conflict and harmonization); Mireille Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism: A 
Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Transnational Legal World, Naomi Norbert (trans), (Hart, 2009) 
(ditto);Koskenniemi and Leino (n 47) (ditto); Harro van Asselt, ‘Managing the Fragmentation of International 
Climate Law’ in Erkki J Hollo, Kati Kulovesi and Michael Mehling (eds), Climate Change and the Law (Springer, 
2013) 329 (conflict and inconsistency); Bratton (n 61) (competition and coordination); Esty and Geradin (n 62) (co-
opetition).  
142 Eg Calliess and Zumbansen (n 34) (competition, cooperation, collaboration, antagonism, collision, contestation, 
conflict, harmonization, constitution, delegation, translation, transposition, integration, migration, co-regulation, 
meta-regulation and more); Robert Wai, ‘Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function 
of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization’ (2002) 40 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 109 
(‘liftoff’ and ‘touchdown’); Santos, New Legal Common Sense (n 36) 473–74 (violence, coexistence, reconciliation 
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this diversity, treating the character of interaction as an empirical question, not an assumption. While 
descriptive typologies have value,143 they do not capture all the observed complexity. The challenges for 
theory include explaining why interaction takes particular forms, how certain forms overlap or transform 
into others, and how forms vary across scales or levels of interaction. In the latter connection, theories of 
meso-level, inter-scheme interactions such as orchestration144 and meta-regulation145 are likely to be 
particularly fruitful.  
 In this special issue, Biggins and Scott show the complexity of even cooperative interactions. 
Interactions between ISDA and state actors included ISDA’s enrolment of state regulatory capacity; its 
oversight of governments (through model laws, lobbying and strategic litigation); state recognition of 
ISDA self-regulation; implicit state delegation of authority to ISDA DCs; and state cooptation of 
potentially subversive non-state regulation through selective incorporation. Here the drivers of conflict 
and cooperation produced a delicate, continually renegotiated balance between state and non-state 
regulation. 
 Buhmann demonstrates how the character of interaction can change over time, across institutional 
settings, and among components of regulatory governance. Interactions shifted from conflict to 
cooperation at the agenda-setting stage and to cooptation and meta-regulation at the rule formation stage; 
cooptation largely continued during implementation. The earlier-described mutual enrolment and piggy-
backing by the UN Guiding Principles and other TBG schemes suggests a form of symbiosis that may not 
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and divergence); Stepan Wood, ‘Environmental Management Systems and Public Authority in Canada: Rethinking 
Environmental Governance’ (2003) 10 Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 129 (steering, self-discipline, knowledge 
production, reward, command, benchmarking, challenge and borrowing); Errol Meidinger, ‘Private Import Safety 
Regulation and Transnational New Governance’ in Cary Coglianese, Adam M Finkel and David Zaring (eds) Import 
Safety: Regulatory Governance in the Global Economy (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) 233 (mimicry, 
accommodation, competition, and exchange); William Twining, ‘Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global 
Perspective’ (2010) 20 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 473, 489 (symbiosis, subsumption, 
imitation, convergence, adaptation, partial integration, avoidance, subordination, repression, and destruction). 
143 Eg Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization’ (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 1103 
(identifying five forms of judicial interaction); David Trubek and Louise G Trubek, ‘New Governance and Legal 
Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation’ (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 539  
(identifying three kinds of interaction between non-state and state legal orders); Dinah Shelton (ed), International 
Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (Oxford University Press, 2011) 
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144 Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New 
Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit’ (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 501; 
Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘International Regulation without International Government: Improving IO 
Performance through Orchestration’ (2010) 5 Review of International Organizations 315; Philip Schleifer, 
‘Orchestrating Sustainability: The Case of European Union Biofuel Governance’ (2013) 7(1) Regulation & 
Governance  533–546; Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Taking Responsive Regulation Transnational: 
Strategies for International Organizations’ (2013) 7 Regulation & Governance 97; Kenneth Abbott and others (eds), 
International Organizations as Orchestrators (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
145 Eg Bomhoff and Meuwese (n 55); Scott (n 55); Paul Verbruggen and Tetty Havinga, “The Rise of Transnational 
Private Meta-Regulators,” Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 71/2014, TBGI Project Subseries No. 20; 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2512843. 
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be captured by conventional concepts of cooperation. These increasingly integrative interactions produced 
norm convergence, consolidation of the Guiding Principles’ dominance and the resurgence of state 
authority in this field.  
 Doorey emphasizes the simultaneity of competition and cooperation. From the time NGOs 
formed the Workers’ Rights Consortium as an alternative to industry codes of conduct, inter-scheme 
competition combined with dialogue and cooperation. Co-opetition continued even after the leading 
schemes defined common standards for pilot testing. The six participating schemes competed to have 
their standards adopted, yet also agreed to favour the highest standards within the six schemes—including 
a living wage clause.  
 Co-opetition also plays a key role in Webb’s study. Co-opetition occurs when ‘rule instrument 
developers that are in other respects in competition with each other, may for strategic reasons recognize 
an opportunity for collaboration for their mutual benefit’.146 Webb investigates the drivers and effects of 
this mode of interaction. Drivers include competitors’ desires to align their rule instruments, advance their 
own agendas through competitors’ schemes, and enjoy the legitimacy-enhancing benefit of association 
with other schemes. In this case, co-opetition led to endorsement of ISO 26000 by intergovernmental 
organisations, governments, TBG schemes, transnational corporations and NGOs. It also produced 
regulatory synergies, with competitor schemes articulating general principles and ISO 26000 providing 
detailed standards and guidance. 
The processes of normative convergence and diffusion described by Buhmann, Doorey and Webb 
deserve greater attention. Which norms spread to which governance schemes, and why? If norms do not 
spread, why not? Is co-opetition a special case, or a broader phenomenon? Is it more likely to strengthen 
or weaken regulatory standards, and to enhance or degrade regulatory capacity?  
3.6 Mechanisms and Pathways of Interaction 
Specifying and theorizing the mechanisms and pathways that link drivers, interactions and effects 
holds great promise for middle-level theory building. An understanding of mechanisms and pathways 
offers substantial purchase on interactive dynamics. Such understanding also helps identify the 
opportunities for structurally weak parties to remake their regulatory worlds.147 At the same time, Abbott 
and Snidal warn that mechanisms are ‘challenging analytical tools’:  
They are often difficult to identify and analyze in practice. They require the development of 
‘stylized facts,’ so that detailed descriptions do not obscure analytical insights. They may be 
complex … multiple mechanisms may be at work.148  
 Mechanisms are normally defined in causal terms: they ‘specify the micro-level elements … 
through which causal factors operate’.149 In the context of global business regulation, Braithwaite and 
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Drahos define them as ‘shortish causal chains’150 ‘that increase the extent to which patterns of regulation 
in one part of the world are similar, or linked, to patterns of regulation in other parts’.151 In many 
accounts, actors exploit mechanisms instrumentally.152 Mechanisms may also operate unintentionally, as 
in Teubner’s ‘blind co-evolution’ of systems via quasi-biological mechanisms of variation and 
selection.153 For our purposes, mechanisms and pathways emphasize causal logics, but can also 
accommodate broader forms of explanation. 
Elsewhere, we canvass numerous mechanisms and pathways of TBGI, including norm 
entrepreneurship, enrolment, meta-regulation, experimentalism, rule incorporation, conditional rule 
referencing, benchmarking, peer review, overlapping membership, mimicry, learning and technical 
systems.154 The legal literature reveals a range of others.155 The main task for theory building, then, is to 
determine which mechanisms are most important in transnational business governance. 
Braithwaite and Drahos have laid important groundwork for this exercise. Based on exhaustive 
study in thirteen fields spanning several centuries, they identify seven mechanisms through which 
business regulation has globalized: coercion, reward, modeling, reciprocal adjustment, non-reciprocal 
coordination and capacity-building.156 Modeling is the most consistently important, followed by 
reciprocal adjustment.157 There is no master mechanism, however; the globalization of regulation always 
involves multiple mechanisms.158 
A question for theory is to clarify the relationships among modeling, mimicry and isomorphism. 
Many scholars equate modeling and mimicry, but Braithwaite and Drahos distinguish them. For them, 
modeling entails observational learning, in which actors display, symbolically interpret and emulate 
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153 Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (n 71), 80. 
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Oberthür (n 134)).  
156 Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 25–6, 532–33. 
157 Braithwaite and Drahos (n 15) 30, 542–3, 546–7. 
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regulatory models; imitation merely involves one actor matching another’s actions, evidently without 
reflection.159 Imitation, then, is restricted to unconscious isomorphism, where isomorphic pressures 
emerge from systems, cultures or mentalities.160  
Braithwaite and Drahos offer a detailed theory of modeling in which model missionaries promote 
a particular model because they believe in it; model mercenaries exploit the markets model missionaries 
open up; model mongers, lacking the resources to develop their own models, experimentally float 
numerous models in hopes of finding one that catches on; model misers adopt pre-packaged models 
(often floated by model mongers) to economize on the costs of model development; and model 
modernizers in the periphery adopt models from the centre to harness the legitimating power of a modern, 
progressive identity.161  
Modeling is important because of bounded rationality: decision-makers are unable to address 
fully the limitless range of issues they face, so it often makes sense to adopt pre-packaged solutions that 
are good enough, rather than search for optimal solutions.162 Decision-makers frequently ‘dither in a 
confusion of complexity they cannot grasp, which is why they can be led by entrepreneurs who encourage 
them onto a plausibly interest-enhancing path’.163 
Modeling is also important because it is one of the few mechanisms available to the weak. 
Structurally weak model mongers can devote their scarce resources to floating regulatory models until 
they land on one that catches a powerful adversary off balance; then they can pour all their resources ‘into 
a feat of political ju-jitsu that flips the off-balance adversary’.164 Yet Braithwaite and Drahos’s 
conclusions about model mongering are not entirely persuasive. Most of their case studies suggest that the 
key actors are either model missionaries, who promote preferred models out of belief, or model 
mercenaries, who profit by promoting a particular model, rather than experimentalist model mongers.  
Other significant mechanisms in TBGI include conditional rule referencing,165 overlapping 
memberships and contracting.166 Benjamin Cashore, Michael Stone and Lars Gulbrandsen show that rule 
referencing in forest certification creates interdependencies that enhance the capacities of state and non-
state regulators: non-state schemes benefit from states’ enforcement capacity, states gain non-state 
schemes’ norm-generating capacity and each gains symbolic resources from the other.167 Theories of 
transnational governance interaction should also acknowledge the multiplicity and interlinking of 
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mechanisms, in line with Braithwaite and Drahos’s observations.168  More empirical and theoretical work 
on mechanisms is also needed. Even Braithwaite and Drahos’s analysis of mechanisms is generic and 
synthetic. It is often unclear which mechanisms are employed, by which actors for what purposes, or how 
they operate. 
Finally, scholars should investigate the structural factors that affect mechanisms and pathways. 
Santos identifies six structural places in society, each with its own interactive logic. The coexistence and 
overlap of structural places mean that interactions ‘are often informed by different and mutually 
incongruent logics’.169 Alternatively, pathways of interaction may coincide with or exploit the pathways 
of economic production and consumption.170 Markets, hierarchies, networks and communities may have 
different logics that affect the availability or operation of mechanisms. For example, coercion may be 
more common and effective in a hierarchy than in a network.171 Braithwaite and Drahos observe that 
webs of dialogue are more common and more often effective than webs of reward and coercion,172 and 
that strategic wisdom lies in knowing ‘which strand(s) to seek to tighten at which moment in order to 
tauten a web that floats in time and space’.173 Networks themselves may be conceived as pathways of 
interaction or structures conditioning interaction. Variation in network characteristics may also influence 
the character of interaction between regulatory networks and conventional regimes.174  
In this special issue, Biggins and Scott identify five mechanisms of interaction in the case of 
derivatives: ISDA standard-setting; its lobbying and other activities designed to shape the regulatory 
regime for derivatives; its intervention in important court cases; its provision of advice on systemically 
important events; and its central role in reforming credit default swap settlement mechanisms after the 
global financial crisis. These are not mechanisms in our sense, however; they are case-specific strategies. 
Yet it may be possible to abstract more general mechanisms from these examples. For example, ISDA’s 
standard-setting and lobbying, and states’ passage of ISDA’s model laws, may be instances of modeling, 
norm entrepreneurship and rule incorporation.  
This point highlights the need to clarify what constitutes a mechanism or pathway, and how they 
are distinct from strategies, modes, drivers and shapers of interaction. For analytical purposes 
mechanisms must be abstracted from specific actions, but concrete enough to be recognizable. 
Braithwaite and Drahos, for example, focus not on higher-order, abstract mechanisms like reinforcement, 
but on lower-order, concrete mechanisms like reward and coercion.  
 Buhmann’s article poses similar issues. She describes networks, discursive strategies and even 
TBG schemes as mechanisms of interaction. Yet her examples suggest the mechanisms of modeling, 
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mimicry, rule incorporation, learning and other cognitive interaction mechanisms.175 Buhman also 
suggests that mechanisms at the evaluation and review stage include cross-scheme comparison of 
experiences, investigation of complaints, and governmental reporting. These resemble generalizable 
mechanisms of peer review, benchmarking, learning and experimentalism.  
 Doorey proposes a typology of four actor-level and three scheme-level mechanisms and 
pathways. In the first four, the pathways are actors who participate in multiple TBG schemes. These 
mechanisms include dialogue and norm entrepreneurship, with actors ‘like honeybees pollinating TBG 
schemes with ideas and norms’;176 information distribution and knowledge sharing across schemes; 
supply chain coordination, with suppliers selecting or avoiding more stringent codes; and policy learning 
and diffusion, through education, research, and social networks. The relationship between dialogue and 
norm entrepreneurship, on one hand, and policy learning and diffusion, on the other, is not entirely clear: 
both involve actors spreading the ‘pollen’ of norms and knowledge. The first scheme-level mechanism is 
mimicry or mimetic isomorphism, in which a TBG scheme adopts successful designs or norms; Doorey 
seems to treat this as synonymous with modeling, raising the definitional issue discussed above. The final 
two mechanisms are conditional rule referencing and meta-regulation. 
 Webb’s description of ISO 26000 as a bridge suggests a master metaphor for several mechanisms 
of interaction. Webb identifies several bridging functions: top-down transposition of concepts from 
intergovernmental to non-state instruments; bottom-up transposition of concepts from narrow non-state 
standards to broader social responsibility activities; uniting public, private and civil society sectors in 
standards development and implementation; and the emergence of a global custom. However, the main 
mechanisms at work in the case are modeling, institutional isomorphism and conditional rule referencing.  
Webb’s study indicates that these mechanisms may work top-down or bottom-up, and may 
amplify the source standard, not just duplicate it. Thus ISO 26000 extended the due diligence and Plan-
Do-Check-Act approaches to all social responsibility activities, from human rights and management 
systems respectively. The case also highlights meta-regulation and contracting as coordination 
mechanisms. Contracting through Memoranda of Agreement between ISO and other instrument 
developers facilitated top-town transposition and normative convergence. Finally, the rich normative 
conversation achieved in the ISO 26000 drafting process appears to embody Doorey’s mechanism of 
dialogue.    
3.7 The Development of Interactions over Time and Space 
‘It is easier to call for a dynamic theory than to produce one,’ Abbott and Snidal remind us.177 Yet 
theories of TBGI must seek to capture spatio-temporal dynamics. 178 Over time, institutional structures 
and processes converge and diverge; some norms and practices spread, others do not; standards are 
ratcheted up or down; states enter and retreat from governance fields; non-state regulatory authority 
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waxes and wanes; conflicts transform into cooperation or vice versa; some TBG schemes wither away 
and others dominate. Change over time is a key dimension of our TBGI analytical framework, but the 
spatial dimension also merits more attention. Transnational business governance has an uneven 
geography that implicates disparities between legal centres and peripheries.179  
Theoretical approaches that integrate spatial and temporal dynamics into their conceptual 
apparatus should be especially fruitful—examples include the recursive dynamics in theories of 
experimentalism, transnational legal orders and open systems. Shaffer and Halliday theorize transnational 
legal ordering as a dynamic, recursive process of interaction among transnational and national law, 
characterized by mutual influences, temporary and contingent settlements, and periodic destabilizations 
triggering further recursive cycles.180 Experimentalist governance involves recursive interactions between 
central and local regulating units.181 Doorey’s open systems theory integrates change within its processual 
model of inputs, outputs and feedback loops. Calliess and Zumbansen’s RCRC model emphasize ongoing 
processes of normative experimentation and recombination.182 
When addressing spatio-temporal dynamics, theories should seek to explain instances of 
governance failure, not just of success.183 Meinhard Doelle and others, for example, apply David and 
Louise Trubek’s concepts of complementarity, rivalry and transformation184 to the failure of the Forest 
Carbon Standards Committee.185 It would be instructive to examine whether interactions with other 
governance actors and schemes contributed to this failure. 
All the articles in this special issue describe fascinating changes over time, including changes in 
the scale, character, mechanisms and effects of interaction over time and across institutional settings and 
components of regulatory governance. Doorey highlights another important aspect: tension between 
change at the level of norms and persistence at the level of on-the-ground practices, which may give rise 
to further rounds of interaction and the transformation of governance schemes. All these articles invite 
further theoretical elaboration of temporal and spatial dynamics. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
Interactions among legal actors, institutions, norms and orders are central features of transnational 
law, yet transnational legal theory casts only fleeting or narrow glances at them. The time is ripe to make 
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the interactive dynamics of transnational law the subject of sustained empirical and theoretical attention. 
Efforts to govern global business provide a useful context in which to do so. A rich body of 
interdisciplinary empirical research on this subject is emerging, but more theory building is needed to 
advance scholarly understanding of the dynamics and effects of transnational business governance 
interactions.   
The relative lack of attention to theory in the special issue articles (with the notable exception of 
Doorey) is understandable at this stage in the TBGI research program, when the focus remains on rich 
empirical description. The articles demonstrate that our TBGI analytical framework provides a useful 
common language for conducting and comparing such research.  But the framework’s relative 
agnosticism as to theoretical and methodological approaches should not be mistaken as invitation to 
ignore theory. Quite the opposite: we hope to spur researchers to develop, test and refine theories.  
The most fruitful theoretical approaches, we believe, will recognize the heterogeneity of 
interacting entities; emphasize meso-level interactions among regulatory authorities and schemes; explore 
the links between interactions at different scales, between agency and structure, among components of the 
regulatory process, between drivers and effects and among modes of interaction. They will also examine 
the impacts of interactions on the capacity and performance of regulatory systems, specify concrete 
interaction mechanisms and strive to capture spatio-temporal dynamics.  
No single theory can accomplish all this. A variety of theoretical perspectives will be needed to 
illuminate this complex phenomenon. Theory building, then, can focus on middle-range generalizations 
about specific features of TBGI, with the aim of building up ‘a “toolbox” of explanations that can be 
widely applied, gradually increasing the field’s stock of understanding’.186 There are many possible 
candidates, including: problem structures; interaction mechanisms such as modeling, conditional rule 
referencing and supply chain coordination; interlinkages among mechanisms; regulatory ratchets; 
indicators and determinants of regulatory capacity; meso-level processes like meta-regulation and 
orchestration; cross-scalar strategies like forum-shifting and norm entrepreneurship; and structural logics 
of action. Theoretical ‘modules’ like these are the building blocks of middle-range theory.187 Thick 
descriptive research and inductivist middle-range theory building will allow us to understand better the 
impacts of governance interactions on regulatory outputs, outcomes and capacities and, ultimately, on 
what really matters—the social and economic performance of transnational business and the lives of 
ordinary people. 
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